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THE LEGAL STATUS OF EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS ON AIR TRANSPORTATION
By OLIVER J. LISSITZYN
Assistant Professor of Public Law, Columbia University; member
of the New York Bar; formerly with the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.; author of InternationalAir Transport and National Policy (1942) and articles on international law and air transport
problems; Air Transport Command, U.S. Army Air Forces, 19431945; legal analyst, American Airlines, Inc., 1946-1948.

T

HE operating privileges in foreign countries which have made
possible the development of a world-wide network of Americanflag air transport services rest largely upon some forty bilateral air
transport agreements between the Government of the United States
and foreign governments.' The privileges of many foreign-flag air
carriers to operate international services to the United States likewise
depend upon the provisions of these agreements. Members of Congress
and other persons have from time to time expressed the view that
the validity or legal effect of these agreements is questionable, since they
have all been made by executive authority without the advice and
2
consent of the Senate requisite for the conclusion of a treaty.
In a recent judicial proceeding, Colonial Airlines, Inc., a United
States air carrier which is authorized to operate, inter alia, a scheduled
air transport service between New York and Montreal, sought to
enjoin the members of the Civil Aeronautics Board from holding hearings and having further proceedings on the application of Trans1 Argentina, 1947, Department of State Press Release (cited infra as PR)
No. 387; Australia, 1946, Treaties and Other InternationalActs Series (cited infra as TIAS) 1574; Austria, 1947, TIAS 1659; Belgium, 1946, TIAS 1515; Bolivia,
1948, PR No. 1030; Brazil, 1946, TIAS 1900; Burma, 1949, PR No. 740; Canada,
1939, Executive Agreement Series (cited infra as EAS) 159; 1945, EAS 457; 1949,
TIAS 1934; Ceylon, 1948, TIAS 1714; Chile, 1947, TIAS 1905; Colombia, 1929,
U.S. ForeignRelations, 1929, II, 882-884; China, 1946, TIAS 1609; Czechoslovakia,
1946, TIAS 1560; Denmark, 1944, EAS 430; Dominican Republic, 1949, TIAS
1935; Ecuador, 1947, TIAS 1606; Egypt, 1946, TIAS 1727; Finland, 1949, TIAS
1945; France, 1946, TIAS 1679; Greece, 1946, TIAS 1626; Iceland, 1945, EAS 463;
India, 1946, TIAS 1586; Ireland, 1945, EAS 460; Israel, 1950 PR No. 623; Italy,
1948, TIAS 1902; Lebanon, 1946, TIAS 1632; New Zealand, 1946, TIAS 1573;
Norway, 1945, EAS 482; Panama, 1949, TIAS 1932; Paraguay, 1947, TIAS 1753;
Peru, 1946, TIAS 1587; Philippines, 1946, TIAS 1577; Portugal, 1945, EAS
050; Siam, 1947, TIAS 1607; Spain, 1944, EAS 432; Sweden, 1944, EAS 431;
Switzerland, 1945, TIAS 1576; Syria, 1947, PR No. 384; Turkey, 1946, TIAS
1538; Union of South Africa, 1947, TIAS 1639; United Kingdom, 1946, TIAS
1507; Uruguay, 1946, PR No. 910; Venezuela, 1948 (text not published). Several
of these agreements are not yet definitely in force; others have been amended
(see infra, n. 85). Provisional agreements which do not accord reciprocal operating privileges to the other parties in the United States have also been made with
Korea, 1949, TIAS 1979; Yugoslavia, 1949, 22 Department of State Bulletin 63;
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (texts not published). The United States was a
party to the multilateral Chicago Air Transport Agreement of 1944, EAS 488,
until July 25, 1947. 15 Department of State Bulletin 236 (1946).
2 See infra.
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Canada Air Lines, a Canadian air carrier, for a competing service
between the same two cities, and from issuing a permit for such service.
Among the many grounds advanced by Colonial in support of its action
was the alleged invalidity of the air transport agreement between the
United States and Canada signed on June 4, 1949, in which the United
States undertook to permit an airline designated by Canada to operate
a service between Montreal and New York.3 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, sitting -as a three-judge statutory
court, found it unnecessary, in dismissing the complaint, to pass upon
the validity of the agreement. 4 Colonial appealed to the Supreme
Court, but shortly before the date of the hearing moved to dismiss its
appealY The question of the validity and legal effect of air transport
agreements thus remains judicially unresolved. In view of the importance of these agreements in the air commerce policy of the United
States, their legal position merits some consideration.
Air transport agreements will be discussed here primarily with
reference to one aspect common to most of them, namely the qualified
undertaking on the part of the United States to permit foreign airlines
designated by the other party to operate regularly scheduled commercial air transport services to the United States.6 Questions which may
be raised with respect to other aspects of the agreements, such as the
provisions dealing with rates and customs duties, will not be considered
here.
Two problems of the validity and effect of air transport agreements
must be distinguished - the domestic and the international. An inter3 TIAS 1934. See Complaint for Injunction, filed August 17, 1949, Colonial
Airlines, Inc., v. Russell B. Adams et al., Transcript of Record, Supreme Court of
the United States, October Term, 1949, No. 539, p. 33.
4 87 F. Supp. 242 (1949).
5 Now York Times, February 6, 1950, p. 41; appeal dismissed, 70 S. Ct. 490
(1950).
6 For example, the pertinent parts of the 1949 agreement with Canada, TIAS
1934, are as follows:
Article 2: Each contracting party grants to the other contracting party
the rights specified in this Agreement and the Annex thereto for the purpose
of establishing the international air services therein described, whether such
services be placed in operation immediately or at a later date at the option of
the contracting party to whom the rights are granted.
Article 3: Any air service described in the Annex hereto may be placed
in operation as soon as the contracting party to whom the rights have been
granted has designated an airline or airlines to operate such service, and has
so notified the other contracting party. Each contracting party reserves the
right to withdraw at any time the designation of an airline and substitute the
designation of another. The contracting party granting the rights shall, subject to Article 7 hereof, be bound to give, with a minimum of procedural delay, the appropriate operating permission to the airline or airlines concerned;
provided that the airline or airlines so designated may be required to qualify
before the competent aeronautical authorities of the contracting party granting the rights under the laws and regulations normally applied by those
authorities before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated
by this Agreement; and provided that in areas of hostilities or of military
occupation, or in areas affected thereby, such operation shall be subject to the
approval of the competent military authorities.
Article 7: Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10 of this Agreement, each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke permission to exercise the rights specified in this Agreement and the Annex thereto
by an airline designated by the other Contracting party in the event that it is
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national agreement entered into on behalf of the United States in accordance with its constitutional law is normally valid and binding
under international law, even though, as will be seen below, it may be
unenforceable in the domestic law of the United States without legislative action. But it does not necessarily follow that an international
agreement made by the President of the United States in excess of his
powers under the constitutional law of the United States is not internationally binding on the United States, however devoid of legal force
it may be domestically. The international legal effect of such an agreement is further discussed below. The more immediate problem of the
legal position of air transport agreements under the constitutional
and statutory law of the United States resolves itself into two questions:
(a)- What would be the legal position of these agreements in the absence of statutory law on the subject? (b) What is the effect, if any,
of existing statutory law on their legal position? These questions cannot be answered without reference to the position in the constitutional
law of'the United States of executive agreements in general.
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL USAGE

"Executive agreements" is a term commonly used to designate
international agreements made by the President of the United States
without the advice and consent of the Senate given by the two-thirds
majority requisite for the conclusion of a treaty under the Constitution.
The power of the President to make such agreements with and without
the authorization or approval of Congress has been recognized by the
Supreme Court7 and has been exercised since the beginnings of na-

tional government. It has been the practice of Congress since 1792
to authorize by statute the making of executive agreements on a large
variety of subjects.8
not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline

are vested in nationals of the other contracting party, or in case of failure by
such airline or the government designating such airline to comply with the
laws and regulations referred to in Article 6 hereof, or otherwise to perform
its obligations hereunder to fulfill the conditions under which the rights are
granted in accordance with this Agreement and its Annex.
Annex, Section II: The Government of the United States of America
grants to the Government of Canada the right to conduct, by one or more airlines of Canadian nationality designated by the latter country, the international air services specified in Schedule Two hereof.
7 B. Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583 (1912) ; U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Cf. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1882),
and comment thereon by Fraser, Sen. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d sess., at 27-28;
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
8 In 1890, Solicitor General William Howard Taft found that the practice of
making postal agreements under the authority of Acts of Congress, without approval by the Senate as treaties, was a well-established constitutional usage. 19
Op. A. G. 513. In 1938 Congress recognized in general terms the existence of
"international agreements other than treaties to which the United States is a
party" by providing for their publication in the Statutes at Large. 52 Stat. 760, 1
U.S.C. §30. For similar but less clear language in previous enactments, see 28
Stat. 615 (1895) and 49 Stat. 1551 (1936). For extensive discussions of the position of executive agreements in the history and constitutional law of the United
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The making of executive agreements is thus a constitutional usage
of long standing which apparently rests upon the President's vast but
ill-defined powers in the fields of foreign relations and national defense.9 Neither the usage nor the decisions of courts, however, provide
clear-cut guidance as to the scope of the executive agreement-making
power. It is clear that the scope of the treaty-making power and the
scope of the executive agreement-making power are not mutually
exclusive. What may be properly accomplished by executive agreement may also be accomplished by treaty. The proposition, therefore,
that a certain matter is a proper subject for a treaty does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that it is not a proper subject for an executive
agreement. But it likewise does not necessarily follow that everything
that may be accomplished by treaty may also be accomplished by executive agreement.
The scope of the executive agreement-making power has been the
subject of continued and often bitter controversy. It has been argued,
for example, that subjects which were customarily dealt with by treaties
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution should continue to be
so dealt with, since such must have been the intention of the Framers,
while other subjects may perhaps be legitimately dealt with by executive agreement.' 0 The fact that the Constitution absolutely forbids a
State of the Union to enter into "any treaty," but permits it to enter
into an "agreement or compact" with the consent of Congress" has
been used, in conjunction with definitions of allegedly equivalent terms
found in the works of Vattel, an eighteenth-century Swiss jurist whose
writings were widely read in America, to imply that an executive
agreement may not impose a continuing obligation on the United
States, see McClure, InternationalExecutive Agreements (1941); McDougal and
Lans, "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy," 54 Yale L. J. 181 and 534 (1945);
Borchard, Opinion on the Question Whether the St. Lawrence Waterway and
Power Project Can Be Concluded by Executive Agreement with Canada or Requires a Treaty (Rev. ed., 1946). See also Levitan, "Executive Agreements: A
Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the United
States," 35 Ill. L. Rev. 365 (1940) ; Simpson, "Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 67 (1938) ; Borchard, in 53 Yale L. J. 664 (1944) and 54
Yale L. J. 616 (1945) ; Constitutionality of St Lawrence Legislation, Memorandum Submitted by the Department of State to a Subcommittee of the Committee on
ForeignRelations, U.S. Senate, on S. Joint Res. 104, Senate Committee Print, 79th
Cong., 2d sess. (1946).
9 The Supreme Court has spoken of "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations." Per Sutherland, J., in U.S v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Although perhaps not necessary to the decision
of the case, this definition of the President's position is believed to represent the
considered view of the Court and to express a well-established constitutional doctrine. See U.S. v. Belmont and U.S. v. Pink, supra n. 7. The Court also said that
it had recognized, in previous decisions, that the power to make such international
agreements as do not constitute treaties existed as inherently inseparable from
the conception of nationality, and had "found the warrant for its conclusions not
in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations." Id. See, in general, Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (1948), 259 et seq.
10 Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, Sen. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong..
2d Sess (1944).
11 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
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States, but must be capable of performance by a single act.1 2 In recent
years, much broader interpretations of the executive agreement-making
power have gained ground. One view is that the President, in the
exercise of his plenary power in the field of foreign relations, may
make valid executive agreements on any subject on which treaties may
be made; and that the distinction, if any, between executive agreements and treaties is not one of the scope of the power to make them,
but of their effect in domestic law.' 3 Another and narrower view is
that the executive agreement-making power, in the absence of statutory
authority or approval, extends to all matters within the President's
14
independent power of enforcement.
It is not believed that any attempt to delimit rigidly the scope of
the executive agreement-making power is likely to be successful or to
result in a correct portrayal or prediction of actual practice. Some
writers, while refusing to regard the executive agreement-making power
as co-extensive with the treaty-making power, wisely refrain from
attempting to define the scope of the former.' 5 Particularly futile are
attempts to circumscribe the present and future constitutional practice
by subtle deductions, drawn from antiquarian research into the reading habits and hidden states of mind of the Framers in 1788, as to the
"true" meaning of such terms as "treaty," "agreement". and "compact.''
It must ever be borne in mind that the Framers attempted to create an
instrument of effective government, in contrast to the unworkable
Articles of Confederation. And it was precisely in respect to such matters as interstate and foreign commerce, and foreign relations, that the
Articles had proven to be most unworkable. The general purpose of
the Framers was to establish a workable government for the Union,
and any construction of the Constitution which is likely to defeat that
12 Borchard, Opinion, supra n. 8, at 44-49, citing Weinfeld, "What Did the
Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by 'Agreements or Compacts'?" 3 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 453 (1935-36). It is clear that no such restrictive meaning has been
given in practice and court decisions to the term "compact" in inter-State relations. See the critical comments of McDougal and Lans, supra n. 8, at 226-238.
13 McClure, supra n. 8, at 343; ef. McDougal and Lans, supra n. 8, at 246. It
has been held that an executive agreement incidental to the recognition of a foreign government is "the supreme law of the land" in relation to inconsistent State
law. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also, for later developments, Note in
48 Col. L. Rev. 890 (1948). Executive agreements authorized or implemented by
Congressional action are believed to have the same binding effect as treaties in
superseding inconsistent State laws. 40 Op. A. G. 469 (1946). It is doubted that
an agreement made by the President can supersede or modify the operation of an
Act of Congress, unless given effect by appropriate legislation. See infra. A
treaty does supersede a prior inconsistent Act of Congress. Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S.
102 (1933). But cf. Watts v. U.S., 1 Wash. Terr. (N. S.) 288 (1870), where the
court said obiter that an executive agreement with Great Britain, not approved or
authorized by Congress, providing for joint military occupation of an island the
title to which was in dispute between the two nations, could modify the operation
of the Organic Act of the Territory of Washington as enacted by Congress.
14 Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (1922). 237; Levitan,
supra n. 8, at 394. Cf. the view expressed in 1926 by Under Secretary of State
Grew, 5 Hackworth, Digest of InternationalLaw, 402; and Borchard, Opinion, supra n. 8, at 66. Cf. McDougal and Lans, supra n. 8, at 199,. 202, 205.
15 2 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States (2d rev. ed., 1945), at 1416-1418.
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purpose must be rejected. In this, indeed, has been the secret of the
longevity of the Constitution. This view is far from novel; the Supreme
Court has expressed it repeatedly, from the days of Marshall and Story
to those of Stone. Thus, in 1816, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the
Court, said:
The constitution unavoidably deals in general language.
It did
not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter
of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers,
or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into
execution. It was foreseen, that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task. The instrument was not intended
to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked
up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen, what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter; and restrictions and specifications, which, at the present, might seem
salutary, might, in the end, prove the overthrow of the system
itself. 16
Three years later, the same view was expressed by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by
which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the
prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public.
Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the
nature of the instrument, but from the language . . . we must

never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. 17

The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the
welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human
prudence could insure, their beneficial execution ....
This provision
is made in a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.
To have prescribed the means, by which government should, in all
future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties
of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide,
by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they
occur.'

8

More than a century later, the Court, through Mr. Justice Stone, said:
But in determining whether a provision of the Constitution
applies to a new subject matter, it is of little significance that it
L6 Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816), at 326.
17 MCCulloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), at 407.
18 Id., at 415.
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is one with which the framers were not familiar. For in setting
up an enduring framework of government they undertook to carry
out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read
legislative codes which are subject to continuous revision with the
changing course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a
continuing instrument of government.'

It may be proper, therefore, to regard the executive agreementmaking power as extending to all the occasions on which an international agreement is believed by the Chief Executive to be necessary
in the national interest, but on which resort to the treaty-making procedure is impracticable or likely to render ineffective an established
national policy. The test here suggested is the only one that adequately
accounts for the variety of situations in which the President, with or
without the approval of Congress, has resorted to the executive-agreement procedure.2 0 It also accounts for the increasing frequency of
resort to the executive-agreement method in recent years, with the
growth of complexity in international affairs and of pressure of work
in the Senate. Recent counts have yielded the following figures of
treaties and executive agreements made since 1789:21
Period
1789-1839
1839-1889
1889-1939
1939-1945

Treaties
60
215
524
43

Executive Agreements
27
238
917
300

Of the last 100 instruments (in numerical order) published in the
Treaties and Other InternationalActs Series in 1949, 94 were executive agreements and only 6 were treaties.2 2 The treaty-making procedure involves several steps, the most time-consuming of which, in
19 U.S. V. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), at 316. See, further, with specific reference to the commerce power (as example of a field in which constitutional practice has extended far beyond eighteenth-century needs), Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877), at 9; North American Co. v. Securities
& Exchange Commission, 327 U.S. 686 (1946), at 705. For non-judicial expressions of the same view, see Patterson, Presidential Government in the United
States (1947), 7-14.
20 It is of interest that the President, on his own authority, has made several
agreements the performance of which required, or might have required, legislative
action. Thus, the acquisition by executive agreement of the Horse Shoe Reef from
Great Britain (Canada) in 1850 was conditional upon an undertaking to maintain,
at the expense of the United States, a lighthouse, which could not be done without
legislative action. 1 Malloy, Treaties, 663. In 1941, the President, by executive
agreement, undertook the defense of Iceland without expense to Iceland and promised compensation for all damages occasioned to the inhabitants by the military
activities of the United States. EAS 232. On the other hand, when the Chicago
Interim Civil Aviation Agreement was accepted as an executive agreement, a reservation was made by the United States as to "constitutional processes" with respect to the obligation to share the expenses of the international organization
which was to be set up under the agreement. EAS 487. No such reservation was
attached to the Chicago International Civil Aviation Convention, subsequently ratified as a treaty, which contained a similar obligation. TIAS 1591.
21 Borchard, Opinion, supra n. 8, at 50-51, and sources there cited.
22 See list in Department of State, Publications,January 1, 1950 (Publication
3728), 32-40.
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practice, is the consideration of a treaty in the Senate. 23 In contrast,
an executive agreement may be made to come into force on the date
of signature, if it requires no subsequent legislative action. The treatymaking procedure, therefore, may simply fail in cases where the national interest requires prompt action or where the subject-matter of
the agreement makes frequent amendment necessary.
Even the proponents of a strict construction of the executive agreement-making power admit that its limits are not clear or inflexible,
and that an historical test is necessary. 24 They express fear, however,
that the power, unless strictly circumscribed, may lead to executive
abuses. 25 It is believed that this fear, though not entirely unfounded,
overlooks several cogent considerations. History indicates that hostile
public opinion or determined Congressional opposition to agreements
really deemed to be objectionable generally prevents the making of
such agreements or leads to their early termination. This is true not
only because Congress has the power of the purse, but also because the
Chief Executive is not likely to conclude an executive agreement if
there is danger of inconsistent action (or inaction) by Congress.
Congressional opposition was at least partly responsible for the denunciation by the United States in 1946 of the Chicago Air Transport
26
Agreement.
It is not intended, however, to suggest that there may be no instances of improper use of the executive agreement-making power.
The treaty clause of the Constitution is not meaningless. The Executive would be acting improperly if he attempted to commit the United
States, perhaps irrevocably, to a major change in national policy by an
international agreement made on his own authority, or if he entered
into an agreement imposing on the United States an obligation which
he knew, or had reason to believe, to be unenforceable. The difference
between proper and improper uses of the executive agreement-making
power is not to be sought, however, in fine-spun antiquarian distinc25 For examples of delay in the Senate of treaties dealing with aviation
matters,
see infra.
24 "As already observed, the Constitution neither provides a clear definition of

the proper subject-matter of treaties nor provides for the existence, let alone the
scope, of executive agreements. Time and circumstances, however, provide guidance on these questions. We know approximately what kind of questions have
historically been embraced by each form and what therefore are their proper
spheres." Borchard, Opinion, supra n. 8, at 65. Professor Borchard undertakes
on his own authority to distinguish "good" from "bad" usage, and to characterize
decisions of the Supreme Court as wrong. Id., at 51, 76-78. Cf. the view expressed
by John Bassett Moore in 1905 to the effect that the law of the Constitution was
"not more to be found in the letter of that instrument than in the practice under
it." Moore, "Treaties and Executive Agreements," 20 Pol. Sci. Q. 385 (1905),
at 417.
25 Borchard, Opinion, supra n. 8, at 55.
26 The notice of denunciation was given on the day the Senate gave its advice
and consent to the ratification of the Convention, July 25, 1946. 15 Department of
State Bulletin 236 (1946) ; TIAS 1591 This action was preceded by lively criticism of the Agreement in the Senate. See infra.
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it is to be given effect not
tions, but in the needs of the nation; and
27
by judicial, but by political procedures.
However broad may be the scope of the executive agreement-making
power, the effect of an executive agreement in the domestic law of the
United States may well be susceptible of judicial limitation. Treaties,
although they are said by the Constitution to be the supreme law of
the land, may be denied operative effect as domestic law in the
absence of implementing legislation. 28 They may be superseded, as
domestic law, by subsequent inconsistent Acts of Congress. 29 There
can be little doubt that executive agreements are subject to similar
limitations as to effect. Furthermore, while a treaty, if self-executing,
can supersede a prior inconsistent statute,30 it is very doubtful whether
an executive agreement, in the absence of appropriate legislation, will
be given similar effect. 3 '
CONTROL OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION

Until the enactment of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, admission
of foreign aircraft into the United States was not regulated by statute.
It is apparent, however, that the national interest might be adversely
affected by the unregulated operation and landing of such aircraft in
the United States. In the absence of statutory law, did the President
have the power to control the entrance of foreign aircraft? And did
he have the power to undertake by agreement with foreign states to
admit aircraft of their nationality into the United States? These questions were not much discussed, and such practice as existed with respect
to civil aircraft was not conclusive. Operation of aircraft of any kind
in or across the Panama Canal Zone without written authorization
from the Chief Executive of the Zone was prohibited by an Executive
Order dated August 7, 1913.32 In 1914 a Proclamation Relating to the
Neutrality of the Panama Canal Zone forbade public or private aircraft
of belligerent powers to be operated in or over the Zone.3 3 From 1920
on, "air navigation between the United States and Canada was governed
by informal arrangement, usually renewed every six months and made
reciprocal in 1927." 34 There could hardly be any doubt of the exist27

Cf. Wright, "The United States and International Agreements," 38 Am. J.

Int. L. 341 (1944).

28 See, e.g., Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F.(2) 495 (1929).

29 See, e.g., The Head Money Casgs, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Chae Chan Ping
v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
30 Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
31 Even the proponents of a broad construction of the executive agreementmaking power do not claim such an effect for an executive agreement unsupported

by Congressional action. McClure, supra n. 8, at 343; McDougal and Lans, supra

n. 8, at 317. Cf. supra n. 13.

82 Padelford, The Panama Canal in Peace and War (1943), 119, citing Exec.
Order No. 1810, Ex. 0., 150.
3

38 Stat. 2039. See also Padelford, supra n. 32. at 129; and 4 Hackworth,

Digest of InternationalLaw, 389.

3 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 383. It is to be noted that
the arrangement was apparently not reciprocal before the passage of the Air

Commerce Act of 1926. It does not appear whether, during this period, the United

States undertook to admit Canadian aircraft.
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ence of such powers with respect to military aircraft. The President
had long exercised the authority to grant or refuse admission to units
of foreign military forces, 35and had made executive agreements providing for such admission.
With respect to civil aircraft, the question of existence of such
powers does not seem to have given rise to much controversy,86 perhaps
because there was no occasion for it. An historical parallel could be
found in the exercise by the Presidents, in the absence of statutory authority, of control over the laying of cables, power lines, pipe lines
and similar installations connecting the United States with foreign
countries.3 7 It is apparent that control over the operation of foreign
aircraft within the United States is even more necessary in the national
interest than control over cables, power lines and pipe lines. Aircraft
are not only means of communication; they are also means of observation, and of transportation of passengers and goods. They may also
be used as means of attack, or of training for attack. Considerations
of national defense would suffice to justify the exercise by the President of control over the entrance and operation of foreign civil, as
35 See, e g., Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902), where the
Supreme Court said: "While no act of Congress authorized the executive department to permit the introduction of foreign troops, the power to give such permission without legislative assent was probably assumed to exist from the authority
of the President as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the
United States." See also the several agreements with Mexico concerning the
pursuit of Indians across the border, made in 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1890, 1892
and 1896, 1 Malloy, Treaties, 1144, 1145, 1157, 1158, 1162, 1170, 1174 and 1177;
and Simpson, supra n. 8, at 81-82. For other instances see 2 Moore, Digest of
International Law, 389-400, and 2 Hackworth, Digest of InternationalLaw, 304306, 323-324, whence it appears that requests for admission of foreign military
units have generally been referred to the authorities of the States through which
the units were to pass, for acquiescence by such authorities. In 1923 the Department of State felt that for constitutional reasons similar acquiescence was "essential" for the admission of foreign military aircraft. Id., 324-325; cf. 4 id. 386. The
practice of referring the requests to State authorities for their acquiescence was
probably founded on the constitutional guarantee (U.S. Constitution, Art. IV,
Sec. 4) that the United States shall protect each State against invasion. It
would seem to have no bearing on the admission of civil aircraft.
386The Opinion Memorandum of the General Counsel of the Civil Aeronautics
Authority dated October 18, 1939, in which the effectiveness of undertakings
contained in air transport agreements was doubted on the ground of inconsistency
with certain provisions in the Civil Aeronautics Act (see infra), conceded that
in the absence of legislation "the President would have the power to make agreements with foreign countries relating to the access to this country of foreign
aircraft," on the basis of "the general power of the Executive to prohibit physical
contact with our territory in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the United
States." See infra, n. 82.
87 Control over the laying of submarine cables was intermittently exercised
from 1869 until the Kellogg Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 8) expressly conferred the
power of control on the President. With respect to foreign-owned cables it was
never successfully challenged in the courts. 2 Moore, Digest of InternationalLaw,
452-466; U.S. v. La Compagnie Francaise,etc., 77 Fed. 495 (1896); 22 Op, A.G.
13 (1898). With respect to a cable owned by a United States corporation with a
Federal charter, the power was successfully challenged in the lower Federal
courts, which held that the corporation had by statute a Federal franchise which
the President was powerless to disregard. U.S. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 272
Fed. 311 (1921); 272 Fed. 893 (1921). See, in general, 4 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law, 247-256. On power lines, see the opinion of Attorney General
McReynolds, 30 Op. A.G. 217 (1913), citing numerous previous opinions dealing
with cable-laying; on pipe lines, see the opinion of Attorney General Cummings,
38 Op. A.G. 163 (1935). See also 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law,
352-353.
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well as military, aircraft. Broader considerations of national interest,
such as the desirability of preventing monopoly practices and of gaining reciprocal privileges in foreign countries, could be invoked as
additional grounds for the exercise of such control.38 The silence of
Congress could hardly be taken as indicating that it intended foreign
aircraft to be free to operate in the United States without restrictions
of any kindA9
The authority to make executive agreements by which the United
States undertook to admit foreign aircraft could be regarded as incidental to the power to control the admission of such aircraft. But even
if the view were taken that the President had no power to control the
entrance of foreign civil aircraft, it could be argued that he had the
authority to enter into an undertaking to admit such aircraft, since
nothing in the existing law laid down a contrary policy or would have
prevented the enforcement of such an undertaking. 89a In either case,
the enactment of inconsistent legislation by Congress would have in
all probability made the agreements unenforceable, but would not
have necessarily terminated them as international obligations of the
United States.
THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF

1926

The Air Commerce Act of 1926 40 empowered the Secretary of
Commerce, by Section 6 (c), to authorize foreign non-military aircraft
to be navigated in the United States, subject to the condition of reciprocity and the prohibition of cabotage, and provided in Section 6 (b)
that such aircraft might be navigated in the United States only if so
authorized. By Section 6 (a) the navigation of foreign military aircraft
in the United States was made subject to the authorization of the
Secretary of State.
The power of the Secretary of Commerce to authorize the navigation of foreign non-military aircraft was not made subject to judicial
review, or to any set of procedural rules, or to a "fair hearing," and
must be considered as an executive or administrative function. 41 Al38 The policies of prevention of monopoly, preservation of opportunities for
American-owned cables, and control over rates had been the motives for the
President's assertion of power to control the laying of cables by foreign companies. See 2 Moore, Dige8t of International Law, at 455.
39 Cf. the absence of statutory restrictions on the admission of foreign troops
See supra n. 35.
39a The Executive had previously asserted authority to enter into international commitments which could be carried out within the framework of existing law. An example is the practice of making agreements on most-favored-nation
treatment in the matter of customs duties in the absence of statutory authority
but in conformity with legislative policy. See the agreement of 1923 with Brazil,
4 Trenwith, Treatie8, 3969; and a discussion and list of such agreements in
McClure, 8upra n. 8, at 174-176.
40

44 Stat. 568.

41 The pertinent language of Section 6 (c) of the Air Commerce Act as en-

acted was as follows: "If a foreign nation grants a similar privilege in respect
of aircraft of the United States. and/or airmen serving in connection therewith.
the Secretary of Commerce may authorize aircraft registered under the law of

LEGAL STATUS OF EXECUTIVE AVIATION AGREEMENTS

447

though the extent to which an executive officer is subject to the control
of the President in the performance of a statutory function is not
clearly defined in American constitutional law, 42 it is believed that in
the exercise of this power the Secretary of Commerce was bound to act
consistently with the national policy as determined by the President
in a matter so closely related to national defense and foreign relations. 43
This policy could be laid down by the President in an executive agreement. The condition of reciprocity prescribed by the Act strengthens
this conclusion, since negotiations with a foreign country may be
necessary to determine the existence of reciprocity, and an agreement
may be the best means of assuring its maintenance.4 4
The practical construction of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 is indicated by the conclusion of executive agreements relating to the reciprocal admission of foreign non-military aircraft. In the period between
1926 and the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, numerous
air navigation agreements and a few air transport agreements were
entered into by the action of the Executive. The air navigation agreements typically included reciprocal grants of privileges of transit,
landing, and commerce for aircraft on non-scheduled flights. 45 An
agreement with Colombia accomplished by exchange of notes on February 23, 1929,46 provided that American commercial aircraft were to be
allowed to fly and land along the coasts of Colombia, while Colombian
commercial aircraft were to receive similar privileges along the coasts
of the United States and in the Canal Zone. These privileges were not
limited to non-scheduled operations. An arrangement between the
United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Canada for regular
trans-Atlantic services was negotiated in the course of diplomatic
discussions which took place between 1935 and 1937. This arrangement, not embodied in any single document, has never been made
the foreign nation and not a part of the armed forces thereof to be navigated in
the United States . . ." It was held by the Attorney General that under Reorgani-

zation Plan No III (54 Stat. 1231) this power, not expressly mentioned in the
Plan, devolved upon the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, rather than upon
the Civil Aeronautics Board, because it was essentially administrative. 40 Op.
A.G. 136 (1941).
42 See Corwin, supra n. 9, at 94-114, 148-149, and sources there cited.
43 Although the reasons for the Secretary's decisions on particular applications were generally not made public, there are indications that considerations of
national defense entered into the decisions in some cases. See statement of Clinton M. Hester, appearing for the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation,
March 23, 1938, Hearings on H.R. 9738 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 75th Congress, 3d sess., at 148
44 Reciprocity may, of course, be found to exist in the absence of agreement;
nevertheless, it is significant that statutory authority to grant privileges to foreign
nationals on the condition of reciprocity had been the basis for executive arrangements for reciprocal treatment with respect to such matters as copyright protection, trade marks, visa fees, tonnage duties, certificates of admeasurement of
vessels, customs duties, ship load lines, and taxes on shipping income. McClure,
supra n. 8, at 58 60, 79, 85, 153-154, 156, 163; 5 Hackworth, Digest of International
Law, 413-414.
45 These agreements are listed in 4 Hackworth. Digest of InternationalLaw,
at 383-384.
46 U.S. Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 882-884; see Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 7 C.A.B. 149 (1946).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

public in full, but was implemented by the issuance in April, 1937, of
15-year permits to Pan American Airways by the United Kingdom,
Ireland and Canada, and to Imperial Airways by the United States,
and has been repeatedly cited and applied in the decisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Board, which has referred to it as an "exchange-of-notes
agreement.

' 47

Despite this consistent practice, the propriety of undertaking
generally, by executive agreement, to admit the aircraft of a foreign
nation was occasionally denied or doubted. 48 The needs of the nation
prevailed over these doubts.
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF

1938

4

The Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938, 9 passed after extended
hearings held over a period of years on a number of bills for the regulation of commercial aviation, transferred from the Secretary of Commerce to the newly created Civil Aeronautics Authority the power to
authorize the navigation in the United States of foreign non-military
aircraft 0 Far more important was the comprehensive provision, contained in Title IV, for the economic regulation of air transportation.
By Section 402 a foreign air carrier was forbidden to engage in foreign
air transportation (defined in Section 1 (21) as "the carriage by aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or
hire or the carriage of mail by aircraft, in commerce between . . . a

place in the United States and any place outside thereof, whether such
commerce moves wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and partly by
other forms of transportation") without a permit issued by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (Board) ;' The Board "is empowered to issue
such a permit if it finds that such carrier is fit, willing, and able
properly to perform such air transportation and to conform to the
provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of
the Board hereunder, and that such transportation will be in the
47 See, e.g., Pan American Airways Company (of Delaware), 1 C.A.A. 118
(1939); Airways (Atlantic) Limited, 2 C.A.B 181 (1940); British Overseas
Airways Corporation,2 C.A.B. 763 (1941). Cf. 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 386. It has been stated by Mr. Stephen Latchford, Adviser on Air Law
in the Department of State at that time, that Section 6 (c) of the Air Commerce
Act of 1926 was relied upon as authority for entering into the negotiations which
culminated in this arrangement. 12 Department of State Bulletin 1104 (1945).
48 Semble, an unreported opinion of the Attorney General, 1936, cited by
Wiprud, "Some Aspects of Public International Air Law," 13 Geo. Wash L. Rev.
247, 267 (1945) ; see also the testimony of Clinton M. Hester on H.R. 9738, infra.
49 52 Stat. 973.

50 Sec. 1107(i) of the Act, amending the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat.
568. By Reorganization Plan No. III, transmitted to Congress on April 2, 1940,
54 Stat. 1231, as interpreted by the Attorney General, 40 Op. A.G. 136 (1941),

this power was transferred to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, an official
who reports to the Secretary of Commerce.
51 Under Reorganization Plan No. IV, transmitted to Congress on April 11,
1940, 54 Stat. 1234, the regulatory powers of the Authority have been exercised
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. For this reason, the term "Board" is used infra
in place of "Authority."
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public interest." 52 The Board must give public notice of an application for a permit, and must set it for public hearing.5 3 By Section 2 the
Board is directed to consider certain stated policies, "among other
things," as being in the public interest.
Under Section 801 of the Act, the issuance and denial of, as well
as other types of action by the Board with respect to, foreign air
carrier permits issuable under Section 402 (except "grandfather" permits) are subject to the approval of the President. Orders of the
Board in respect to foreign air carriers subject to the approval of the
President under Section 801 are, by Section 1006 (a), exempted from
judicial review. Section 802 directs the Secretary of State to "advise
the Board of, and consult with the Board concerning, the negotiation
of any agreements with foreign governments for the establishment or
' 54
development of air navigation, including air routes and services.
By Section 1102 the Board is directed, inter alia, to exercise and perform its powers and duties under the Act "consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the United States and any foreign
country or foreign countries."
What is the impact of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 upon the
legal status of executive agreements on air transportation? The language of the Act is believed to justify the following conclusions:
(1) Congress did not in terms authorize the making of executive
agreements.
(2) Congress recognized that there were, or could be, agreements
other than treaties by which the United States assumed international
obligations affecting air transportation, "including air routes and services," and that such agreements could be either bilateral or multilateral
executive agreements. This conclusion follows from the use of the
term "agreement" in addition to the terms "treaty" and "convention"
in Section 1102, and from the use of the term "agreements" in Section
802, where it stands alone. The term "agreement" would be meaningless in Section 1102 if it included nothing in addition to the type of
instruments described by the terms "treaty" and "convention." It may
be noted, in this connection, that during the same session Congress provided by statute for the publication of "international agreements other
than treaties" in the Statutes at Large. 55 The fact that in Section 802
the term "agreements" stands by itself, while in Section 1102 it accompanies the terms "treaty" and "convention," is strong evidence that Section 802 was designed to apply only to "agreements" as distinguished
52 Section 402(b) of the Act (with the word "Board" substituted for "Authority"). Section 402(c), known as a "grandfather clause." exempted from the
standards of Section 402(b) permits replacing those issued by the Secretary of
Commerce under the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and in effect on May 14, 1938.
53 Section 402 (e) of the Act.
54 The word "Board" is substituted for "Authority."

55 See n. 8 supra.
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from "treaties" and "conventions," and that the term "agreement" is
not coextensive with the terms "treaty" and "convention." Such differentiated use of these terms in the same statute is virtually conclusive
proof that the term "agreement" in Section 1102 is not meaningless.5 6
It is highly improbable, moreover, that Congress in 1938 was unaware
of the fact that the term "treaty" has been commonly used to designate
an instrument submitted to the Senate for its approval under the treaty
clause, as distinguished from an executive agreement. It follows that
the term "agreement" was probably designed to describe, or to include,
an executive agreement. The expression "any foreign country or foreign countries" in Section 1102 is a clear indication that both bilateral
and multilateral agreements were contemplated.
(3) Congress did not attempt to limit the power asserted by the
President to enter into executive agreements affecting air transportation, and to assume obligations by such agreements, but gave implied
approval to this assertion of power in its full extent.
(4) The Board may not lawfully make an order under Section 402
which would be inconsistent with an obligation assumed by the United
States in a valid executive agreement. If there is an obligation to issue
a permit to a designated foreign air carrier, failure to do so would be a
violation of the Board's statutory duty, even if the record, apart from
the international agreement, would require a finding that the proposed
service is not in the public interest, or that the applicant is not fit, willing, and able to perform such service. The statute makes compliance
with an international obligation the overriding consideration on both
of these issues. There is no ambiguity and no inconsistency in Section
402 and 1102 on this point. Section 1102 is a limitation on the powers
of the Board under Section 402, but in no sense compels the Board to
attempt the performance of two inconsistent tasks. There is, therefore,
no room for application of artificial rules of construction, such as the
rule that the more specific provision must prevail over the more general. 7 The argument that the application of Section 1102 would make
the procedures prescribed in Section 402 useless is a far-fetched reductio
ad absurdum that is not justified by the facts. It will be noted that the
existing air transport agreements leave large areas of determination to
the discretion of the authorities of the United States, by providing, for
example, that the designated foreign airline must or may be required to
qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities under applicable
laws, and that one of the parties to the agreement may withhold a permit if it is not satisfied that the substantial ownership and effective control of the airline is vested in the nationals of the other party.5
There
may be room for the determination of the terms, conditions and dura56

Cf. Latchford, in 12 Department of State Bulletin 1104, 1105 (1945).

57 For an attempt to deprive Section 1102 of its meaning by the application

of this rule see the Opinion Memorandum of the General Counsel of the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, dated October 18, 1939, infra n. 82.
58 See, e.g., the terms of the agreement of June 4, 1949, between the United
States and Canada, supra n. 6.
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tion of the permit, and even for the interpretation of the agreement itself.50 Even if no reservation of any discretionary powers were made in
an agreement, a finding by the Board that the record, apart from the
agreement, would not have justified the issuance of a permit might
serve a useful purpose, as for example by inducing the President to take
steps to abrogate or modify the agreement. Actually, in view of the
powers of the President under Section 801, the value of the Board's
findings is in any event merely advisory.
(5) Even in the absence of Section 1102, the sweeping powers
lodged in the President by Section 801 would imply the power to make
and carry out executive agreements containing undertakings to grant
operating privileges to foreign airlines. It must be noted that the President, under Section 801, has the power to disapprove the denial, as well
as the issuance, of a foreign air carrier permit. Such disapproval is
apparently intended to operate as a direction to the Board to issue the
permit. Otherwise the power of disapproval of the denial would be
meaningless. This construction of Section 801 has been adopted by the
Supreme Court with reference to the power of the President to disapprove the denial of certificates of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 to American applicants proposing to engage in overseas
or foreign air transportation,6 0 and has been consistently followed by
the Board."1 It applies a fortiori to decisions on applications for foreign air carrier permits which, by Section 1006 (a) , are expressly exempt from judicial review. In exercising his powers under Section 801
the President is not bound by the record before the Board, but is free to
turn for advice and confidential information anywhere he pleases, the
Board being merely one of his advisers, whose recommendations are
entitled to no particular weight. The President's powers are not quasijudicial, but political, and were given to him as the organ best fitted to
weigh policy considerations connected with the conduct of foreign relations and national defense of the United States.6 2 Since the President
is thus free to give effect to his own policy, regardless of the views of the
Board, he has the power to enforce any international obligations that he
may assume by an agreement. By implication, he is authorized to make
such agreements as being within the general statutory policy of leaving
59 See, e.g., Swedish Intercontinental Airlines (S.I.L.A.), 6 C.A B. 631,
635-636 (1946); Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), 6 C.A.B. 815 (1946); Linea Aerea
Taca de Venezuela, C.A., 7 C.A.B. 317. 320 (1946); Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do

Sul, Ltda, Brazil-United States Service, Serial E-3896, decided December 22,
1949, approved February 8, 1950, at 4-6.

60 Chicago & Southern Air Lines. Inc., v. Waterman S.S. Corporation, 333
U.S. 103 (1948). See also Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
121 F.(2d) 810 (2d Cir., 1941).

61 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc., Mexico City Operation, 3 C.A.B. 415
(1942) ; Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946) ; "Skycruise"
Case, Orders E-2920, decided June 1, 1949, approved June 9, 1949.
62 See, for statements made in the course of the legislative history of the
Act, Hearings on H.R. 9738 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Congress, 3d sess. at 36-40, 147-148; Hearings on S. 3760 before
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 75th Congress, 3d sess., at 6-7;
83 Congressional Record 6726 (May 12, 1938).
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final determination of the issues of the national interest and of the fitness, willingness and ability of an applicant to the discretion of the
President. The question of undue prejudgment does not arise, since
the President is not required to confine himself, in reaching the decision, to the record made before the Board, or to attach any particular
weight to that record. The President, for instance, as the director of
the nation's foreign relations, may determine that the national interest
in general, and the promotion of American air transport interests in
particular, requires the exchange of air transport operating privileges
with foreign nations on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis, without
regard to the economic and technical characteristics of particular routes
or particular carriers. Subject to the condition of reciprocity laid down
in Section 6 (c) of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, he may decide to
grant operating privileges to a foreign air carrier as a gesture of friendship, or for political reasons entirely unconnected with air transportation, even though such privileges may cause losses to United States air
carriers. In all such cases, adversely affected United States air carriers
may be compensated for their losses, if necessary, by mail pay on a
"need" basis under Section 406 of the Act. 68 Even in the absence of
Section 801, the President's views of the public interest, presented to the
Board through appropriate procedures, would be entitled to great,
though perhaps not conclusive, weight, as the most authoritative and
coordinated determination by the Executive branch of the Government
of what the needs of the foreign policy and national defense of the
United States require. Section 801 in effect gives conclusive weight to
this determination.
(6) Either Section 801 or Section 1102, standing alone, would amply support the authority of the President to enter into executive agreements affecting air transportation, and would enable such agreements
to be carried out within the framework of the Act. Taken together,
and in the light of Section 802, they place this authority virtually beyond all doubt. Nevertheless, it may be noted that the President, unlike the Board, is not required by the statute to act consistently with
the obligations assumed by the United States in an agreement. There
is, therefore, a theoretical possibility of a conflict between the Board's
statutory duty under Section 1102 not to make an order denying operating privileges to a foreign air carrier entitled to such privileges under
an international agreement, and the Board's duty to follow the direction of the President in its actions with respect to such privileges,
should the President direct the Board to act in violation of the obligations of the United States under the agreement.
(7) It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the questions of
the validity and effect of an executive agreement purporting to impose
on the United States an obligation to grant operating privileges to a
foreign air carrier could be raised as justiciable issues, in view of the
68 See Trans-CanadaAir Lines, Montreal-New York Service, C.A.B. Serial
E-4019, decided March 14, 1950, approved March 29, 1950, at 13.
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powers of the President under Section 801 and the exemption from
judicial review of orders in respect to foreign air carrier permits, unless
Section 801 were held to be invalid or a conflict were to arise between
th6 Board acting under Section 1102 and the President acting under
Section 801 - contingencies very unlikely to occur.
Although the conclusions here set forth seem to be justified by the
language of the Act, as judicially construed, some doubts may conceivably persist as to what were the real intentions of Congress in passing
the Act in 1938. In particular, did Congress actually contemplate the
making of executive agreements under which the United States would
be bound to grant operating privileges to foreign airlines? The reference to "air routes and services" in Section 802 would seem to indicate
that such agreements were within the contemplation of Congress; but it
might be urged that this expression was perhaps intended to refer
merely to the establishment and maintenance of navigational facilities,
weather services, traffic regulations, and the like. Is there anything in
the legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Act that throws light on
the actual legislative intent?
(To Be Continued)

